Corruption and the Voter's Decision : Experimental Evidence from Brazil

Cambridge University Press

Corruption and the Voter's DecisionExperimental Evidence from Brazil\nAuthor(s): Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo\nFormat: Paperback\nPublisher: Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom\nImprint: Cambridge University Press\nISBN-13: 9781009499767, 978-1009499767\nSynopsis\nDespite voters' distaste for corruption, corrupt politicians frequently get reelected. This Element provides a framework for understanding when corrupt politicians are reelected. One unexplored source of electoral accountability is court rulings on candidate malfeasance, which are increasingly determining politicians' electoral prospects. The findings suggest that (1) low-income voters in contrast to higher-income voters are responsive to such rulings. Unlike earlier studies, we explore multiple trade-offs voters weigh when confronting corrupt candidates, including the candidate's party, policy positions, and personal attributes. The results also surprisingly show (2) low-income voters, like higher-income voters, wei.